Telecommunications

A cyberattack hit Angola’s largest telecom provider, Unitel, knocking out voice service, mobile data, and internet access for millions of customers across the country. Unitel said it detected the attack shortly after 2 a.m. on July 29 and activated containment measures, but did not identify the attack type or actor. RIPE NCC routing data suggested the company’s external internet connectivity stayed up, pointing instead to disruption of internal core systems; Cloudflare Radar showed a sharp traffic collapse limited to Unitel. The outage also affected point-of-sale terminals that rely on Unitel’s network. — This is a high-impact telecom disruption affecting communications and payments at national scale, with immediate consequences for consumers and businesses. Unitel customers and organizations that depend on its network should expect service instability, activate backup connectivity and payment options where possible, and watch for official incident updates.

The UK has weakened proposed telecom security requirements that were drafted after the China-linked Salt Typhoon spying campaign against telecom networks. Recorded Future News reports the government dropped or delayed several measures after industry objections, including a proposed independent signalling intrusion detection system meant to detect abuse of telecom signalling traffic. The updated code takes effect in mid-July unless Parliament blocks it, and operators can still be judged against it under existing telecom security duties. — This affects how well UK phone and internet providers may detect and contain state-backed intrusions into core communications networks. Telecom operators, regulators, and enterprise customers should review the final code now because the changes may leave weaker safeguards against the kinds of access used for large-scale espionage.

The Pentagon says foreign adversaries used commercially available phone-location data to target or surveil U.S. military personnel in active war zones, affecting troops who carried personal or government-issued smartphones. According to DoD responses released by Sen. Ron Wyden, U.S. Central Command received multiple threat reports tied to commercial data-broker purchases sourced from mobile advertising profiles and device ad identifiers; the department said existing guidance to disable geolocation was incomplete, and some DoD-managed phones still allowed ad-targeting data to be exposed. — This is a real-world national security and personal safety risk, not a theoretical privacy problem: location data sold by brokers can expose troop movements and bases. It raises urgency for stricter mobile-device controls, disabling ad IDs and location sharing, and rethinking bring-your-own-device policies in sensitive environments.

The U.S. Federal Communications Commission voted to tighten security rules for undersea internet cables and to block Chinese and other foreign-adversary equipment from key parts of those systems. The order would require licensing for submarine line terminal equipment (SLTE), the gear that links submarine cables to U.S. terrestrial networks, and would streamline approvals for operators that meet security and oversight conditions. The rules also expand scrutiny of equipment suppliers and third-party service providers tied to cable operations. — Undersea cables carry most of the world's internet traffic, so new security rules for the equipment and operators behind them matter well beyond telecom companies. Cable operators, vendors, and policymakers should review the new licensing and procurement restrictions, especially around foreign-sourced equipment and service providers.